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Abstract 
We begin by identifying a typical governance life-cycle, defined as changes in ownership structure, 
and including both the identity of the major owner and ownership concentration. The cycle is 
marked by key events and phases including start-up, initial growth, mature growth, and possibly a 
crisis and restructuring stage or exit stage. The governance cycle for transitional countries reflects 
some specific characteristics –e.g. often privatization produces specific initial ownership structures, 
with an unusually high proportion of insider, especially, employee ownership. Subsequently pres-
sures for restructuring produce strong impulses for ownership changes. There is limited possibility 
for external finance because of the embryonic development of the banking system and the capital 
markets during early transition. The governance cycle is also influenced by specific features of the 
institutional, cultural and economic environment in a country. The varying importance of these fac-
tors is expected to produce differences in key features of ownership cycles such as the speed at 
which particular ownership changes occur. 
 
To provide simple hypothesis tests, we use new and rich enterprise panel data sets for the three Bal-
tic countries. The data enable various measures of ownership to be constructed (including the iden-
tity of major owners and ownership concentration). The empirical analysis covers the ownership 
cycle with emphasis on initial ownership and subsequent changes. Our key method is to assemble a 
series of transition matrices showing both starting and final ownership configurations for sample 
enterprises and to simultaneously provide information on changes in concentration for the largest 
single owner. For Estonia this is supplemented with an analysis of the frequencies of different own-
ership-cycles including intermediary stages of ownership. In spite of important differences in insti-
tutional development, especially concerning the privatization process, we find that governance cy-
cles are broadly similar in all countries. Employee ownership is rapidly fading and mainly being 
succeeded by managerial ownership. There are changes back and forth between manager and do-
mestic external ownership, while foreign ownership is quite stable. Ownership concentration is 
mostly increasing after privatization, which included diversification both to employees and external 
owners. Since ownership diversification did not sit well with the slow development of the institu-
tional framework, as expected we see a subsequent concentration of ownership on both managers, 
external domestic and foreign owners. However, variation in institutions, there are also important 
differences across countries. The adjustment of ownership structures is faster in Estonia and this 
can be explained by the relatively fast pace of institutional change and evolution of important gov-
ernance institutions, including tough bankruptcy legislation and advances in the financial system. 
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I. Introduction  
The transition in Eastern Europe has been characterized by development of quite specific types of 
ownership structures. These ownership structures have been changing quite fast not only in relation 
to privatization, but also in the post-privatization period. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the 
specific patterns in these ownership dynamics, which is an important part of the development of 
new enterprise governance structures. In the analysis we focus on ownership identity and concentra-
tion, we do not include board representation, management position, compensation etc.   
 
The theoretical starting point is that the choice of governance structure is determined by: enterprise 
characteristics: size, need of capital, information asymmetries, etc. as well as surrounding institu-
tions, market conditions etc. The enterprise characteristics change over the life cycle of the firm. 
Ownership structures are expected to change because different stakeholder groups can contribute in 
different ways to the development of the company at different times in the firm’s development. This 
means a change in governance structure over the life cycle - a specific governance cycle. However, 
the surroundings differ between countries, and countries in transition have specific features and spe-
cific paths of development. Therefore, there can be identified a specific governance cycle during 
transition. Because of the rapid changing environment corporate governance patterns established at 
early stages of transition can be expected to change quite fast. But the speed of transition, the insti-
tutional framework, and the needs of capital and other inputs from different stakeholders vary 
across countries and are expected to produce differences in the nature of the typical life cycle across 
countries - for example in the speed at which particular ownership changes will occur.  
 
Although the three Baltic countries show many similarities in the transition process there are also 
important differences in the developments in the institutional environment. Special attention is paid 
to differences in the privatization process and also to the sophistication of the security of property 
rights. The speed and the depth of reforms have varied in the three Baltic countries. It is of special 
interest to examine these similarities and differences and to analyze if these are associated with dif-
ferences in key dimensions of governance cycles across countries.  
 
To provide simple hypothesis tests, we use new and rich enterprise panel data sets for the three Bal-
tic countries. The data enable various measures of ownership to be constructed (including the iden-
tity of major owners and ownership concentration). The empirical analysis covers the ownership 
cycle with emphasis on initial ownership and subsequent changes. Our key method is to assemble a 
series of transition matrices showing both starting and final ownership configurations for sample 
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enterprises and to simultaneously provide information on changes in concentration for the largest 
single owner. For Estonia this is supplemented with an analysis of the frequencies of different own-
ership-cycles including intermediary stages of ownership.   
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section outlines the conceptual frame-
work for governance changes over the life cycle of the company both in general and in relation to 
the specific conditions in countries in transition. In section 3 we describe the differences in the tran-
sition process and developments in the institutional environment in the three Baltic countries. Sec-
tion 4 outlines the data, reviews previous work on ownership changes in transition economies, and 
present the results of the Baltic analysis in a series of transition matrices that show the start and end 
of the governance cycles both covering ownership identities and concentration. In a final section we 
offer conclusions and implications. 
 
II. Governance cycles: Conceptual Framework 
 Since our idea of the governance cycle for firms in transition economies draws on well-
established concepts for firms in developed economies, it is useful to begin by highlighting some 
themes in that literature and also by examining some matters of scope and definition. 
 In this chapter the type of ownership is connected to the identity of the owners defined in 
relation to their specific stake in enterprise activities – as pure capital providers, managers, employ-
ees, and state representatives. We also distinguish between foreign and domestic owners since in 
economies in transition this is often an important difference. Furthermore, we analyzes the concen-
tration of ownership among the largest single stakeholders, defined as an individual, group or legal 
entity with specific interests in the enterprise - managers, other employees, creditors, external own-
ers, customers, suppliers, central or local government. The governance structure for an enterprise 
can be defined as the distribution among stakeholders of both the formal rights and the appropriated 
rights concerning: 1) control, 2) income flow, 3) assets and liabilities, and 4) information about the 
enterprise (Mygind 2001). The ownership rights are the residual rights left for the owner, when the 
fixed rights to other stakeholders (like wages, interest, taxes) have been fulfilled. Thus, the identity 
of the owners is a central part of the governance structure. Other aspects like the actual organization 
of governance in relation to the board structure and the stakeholders’ representation on the board 
are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
  
The ownership structure in market economies is determined by a combination of institu-
tional, cultural and economic factors. To the extent that there is a possibility for ownership struc-
tures to adjust it can be assumed that, given the institutional setting, the type of ownership that 
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gives the highest return to the owners will prevail. The optimal ownership structure can be ex-
plained from several perspectives including agency-, property rights-, and the transaction cost ap-
proaches. In addition, resource dependence theory analyzes the firm from the point of view of its 
ability to get access to critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The importance of these re-
sources varies over the life-cycle of the firm. At the start the entrepreneurial skills connected to the 
initial business idea is the crucial factor while supply of necessary capital is more important in the 
following stages. While these different theories emphasize different factors, the following elements 
are of recurring importance and are likely to be included in an eclectic approach to ownership dy-
namics. We begin first by considering factors whose main impact is at an individual firm level. 
 
Ownership-determinants: Technology and market at the company level 
 The size of the company is connected with higher demands on capital and entails a pressure 
away from concentrated ownership. The size and capital demands of the company may be very high 
even in relation to a wealthy owner. Therefore, growth is associated with a more diversified owner-
ship structure, a fall in owner concentration (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Putterman 1993, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997). A large size of the company is often used as an explanation for no employee 
ownership. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that a large group of employees need a central moni-
tor to avoid shirking. The larger the group the smaller is each employee’s share in the ownership 
rights and the easier it is for a single employee to free-ride. Hansmann (1996) argues that a larger 
group of employees combined with higher heterogeneity means higher costs for collective decision 
making. 
 A second factor is the need for capital, which is connected to capital intensity, the size of 
the company, and the specificity of capital (see below). This means that it is difficult for wealth-
constrained insiders to take over the company, and if they own the company it will mean a high 
concentration of risk. Insiders put all their eggs, jobs and capital, into one basket (Meade, 1972). 
While for employees this argument is connected with capital intensity, for management ownership 
it will be linked to the absolute amount of risk capital that is needed. There is a trade off between 
single proprietorship by the manager with no governance problem between manager and owners 
and the possibility of diversification and higher capital supply by external more diversified inves-
tors with less control with management (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
 The specificity of the different inputs constitutes another microeconomic factor. If the fixed 
assets can be used in many alternative activities it is much easier to finance them by loans instead of 
by direct risk capital. In these cases banks will play a strong role (Williamson 1985). However, the 
sunk cost of specific capital puts the risk on the provider of capital. In turn, the larger the need for 
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direct risk capital, there is less likelihood that a single provider of capital will emerge to fulfill these 
needs and more diversified ownership can be expected (Fama and Jensen 1985, Putterman 1993). 
On the other hand, the existence of specific capital means a higher dependence on other links in the 
value chain. The hold-up problem may lead to a stronger connection to core suppliers or customers 
with quite concentrated strategic ownership of the company (Grossman and Hart, 1986). A special 
relation concerns the inputs of human capital. If it is highly specific, the risk is high for the employ-
ees. To limit this risk, the employees have an incentive to take direct control and ownership of the 
enterprise.  
 Transaction costs for outside investors are also closely connected to the specificity of the 
assets of the company, information asymmetries, and of the institutional framework (see below.) 
New and yet unproven business ideas with complex human capital make it very difficult and costly 
for external investors, including both passive suppliers of capital like banks and active external 
owners to get reliable information about the company and to monitor the performance of managers. 
 The economic performance of the firm is another potential influence on the ownership type 
with, for example, an economic crisis often implying a shift in ownership. However, this ownership 
change may take several directions: An outside raider or a strategic investor related to the value 
chain may take over the company and perform the necessary restructuring. A managerial buy-out 
may be the result if, based on insider information, the managers estimate the value of the firm to be 
higher than estimates of external investors (Wright et al., 2001). An economic crisis may induce a 
defensive take-over by the employees to introduce more flexible wages and to save their jobs and 
their specific human capital. (Ben-Ner and Yun 1996). However, it can also be argued that high 
performance increases the value of equity and therefore cash constrained employees are tempted to 
sell their shares. In general, high performance means that the company can be sold for a high price, 
and this will attract strong external investors.  
 
Ownership-determinants: economic, institutional and cultural environment for a country
 There are also several factors that together constitute the economic, institutional and cultural 
environment for a country, with differences across countries expected to be associated with differ-
ences in ownership dynamics. If economic performance is found to influence the type of ownership, 
then macroeconomic cycles can also be expected to have an impact on the governance structure, 
and the governance cycle will be related to the business cycles. Thus it has been estimated that 
MBOs are more frequent in business cycle troughs because of the general low pricing of assets dur-
ing dips. This can be seen in relation to tendencies of going private (CMBOR, 2003), while boom 
periods on the stock market means that IPOs and going public give companies a cheaper possibility 
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for raising external finance. Defensive employee take-overs can be assumed to be more frequent in 
recessions because of higher threats of closure and lower alternative employment possibilities (Ben-
Ner 1988). However, the focus in this paper is not the macroeconomic business cycle, but rather the 
life-cycle of the firm. 
 The institutional setting in relation to legislation may present specific barriers or provide 
advantages to different forms of ownership. Thus U.S. legislation has limited bank ownership of 
non-financial companies and ESOP legislation has included tax benefits that favor some elements 
of employee ownership. In Denmark foundation ownership has been favored by tax benefits (Peder-
sen and Thomsen 1997). The degree of protection of minority owners through legislation and the 
liquidity and development of the stock markets can be determining for the diversification of owner-
ship. Thus, concentrated ownership is widespread in countries with a lower degree of minority 
owner protection and less developed capital markets, while diversified ownership is more frequent 
in countries such as US and UK with highly developed capital markets and a high degree of protec-
tion of minority owners (La Porta et al 1999, Becht et al 2002). Also, the development of the bank-
ing sector enhances the possibility of financing growth through bank-loans, and for the role of the 
banks as creditors and potential owners in the governance structure of the firm. 
         Informal social relations and Culture, defined as the historical traditions, cultural values, 
norms and preferences of the stakeholders, can also explain important differences in the governance 
structure between countries. Thus, the optimal ownership structure in Japan is expected to be differ-
ent from the optimal structure in the US because stakeholders have different objectives and differ-
ent relations to each other.  
 
Changes in ownership over the life-cycle of the firm  
             Based on these influences on and determinants of ownership some trends in the develop-
ment of a typical ownership structure for a firm can be noted in relation to the typical life-cycle of 
the firmThe stages in the typical life-cycle of a company can be related to specific stages of the de-
velopment in the ownership structure. Over its life-cycle, a company will change technology, mar-
kets and relations to the different stakeholders. These shifts will have an impact on the role of dif-
ferent stakeholders including the identity of the dominant owners, which is the part of the corporate 
governance structure we focus on when examining the governance cycle. 1
 The governance cycle can be developed in relation to the core stages or core events in the 
company life-cycle. Most companies start-up as small entities with few employees, low capital, and 
low knowledge about the economic potential of the firm. A high proportion fail in the early stage; 
but most of the succeeding companies go into a stage of early growth, with demands for higher in-
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puts of capital, knowledge, networks and employees. The need for extra capital may be spread over 
several growth stages eventually leading to some diversification of ownership. However, a specific 
shock in the environment may also lead the company into a stage of crisis, which makes some kind 
of new inputs necessary. This will often be a new input of capital, which can only be facilitated 
through an ownership change. During these stages the change in ownership can be related to the 
different determinants of the ownership structure. Changing conditions both from within and from 
outside the company generate changes in ownership and hence changes in the development of the 
governance cycle. 
 The classic entrepreneurial company starts up as a small entity often only based on the en-
trepreneur and a few close friends or relatives as partners. It is often based on relatively low capital 
inputs, which can be covered by the entrepreneur and debt based on personal loans e.g. with collat-
eral in the family-house. For the newly started firm, information about the core-competence, the 
main business idea, is yet unproven and difficult to transmit to an external investor. The asymmetry 
in information between the insider and external investor is thus very large and the transaction costs 
of writing and controlling a contract are very high. High uncertainty and lack of reliable informa-
tion about the prospects of the new business and its market potential enhance the problem of asym-
metric information and risks to the external investor. Therefore, most new companies are started by 
single proprietors, and they are often owned by the entrepreneur sometimes with participation of 
close relatives and friends. The capital needed can in most cases be covered by the founders and by 
loans with collateral in the entrepreneurs’ personal assets.   
 The exceptions for starting up new entities are capital-intensive projects developed inside 
large companies or as joint ventures between several companies. When new entities are started by 
parent companies or venture companies from the start external ownership, with a separation of 
ownership and control, exists. However, these types of start-ups (spin offs) are rare in comparison 
to the high number of entrepreneurial management start-ups.  
 Many small entrepreneurial companies close down during the initial stages but eventually, 
those that survive enter an initial growth stage. The expansion of the company to benefit from 
economies of scale demand high capital investments, knowledge and network relations to facilitate 
continued high growth. At the same time, the firms start to create some reputation and market-
experience, which can improve the information relevant for potential external investors. It becomes 
possible to give external investors the necessary information and guarantees based on the assets of 
the new company. Suppliers of capital can be banks or other financial institutions. In most cases 
these creditors will not claim direct control, but often they require to closely monitor the collateral 
behind the loan. In other cases venture capital with a dominating ownership share may supply capi-
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tal. This happens mostly in the early stages of the life-cycle. In some cases the owner tries to attract 
other owners by issuing extra share capital. Often the new owners are found within a rather closed 
circle of stakeholders, typically top-employees of the company, investors from the local society or 
close business partners.  
 At a later more mature growth stage, when the company has developed its potential, it may 
attract a strategic investor with an interest in including the company in its value-chain. Another 
possibility for attracting capital at a developed stage is to go public. This stage could be connected 
to the exit of the venture capital, which sells the company after fulfilling its task. The development 
of going public is also often part of a process of diversification of ownership. Therefore, the process 
of growth is often combined with a lower degree of concentration.  
 Sooner or later many companies run into a stage of crisis. Diverse internal and external fac-
tors, including changes in technology and/or markets or the institutional setting, force the company 
to adjust to the new conditions. The company faces strong pressures to undertake some restructur-
ing. New external capital and expertise are needed, and banks, venture capital and strategic inves-
tors may play an important role. As an alternative to closure insiders may make a defensive take-
over to protect their jobs and their specific human capital. The crisis may also result in an exit of the 
company and liquidation of the assets, which is then taken over by new investors for other activi-
ties. 
 To a large degree, the institutional setting determines both the extent of external ownership 
and the timing of when external owners become involved in the life-cycle. Particular concerns in-
clude the choice between debt and equity, and the involvement of minority shareholders. The pro-
tection of minority shareholders depends on the functions of legislation, the transparency of the in-
formation about the company, the functioning of the market for shares (not only in relation to pub-
licly traded, but also for closely held companies). In countries with developed markets for owner-
ship and strong protection of minority owners we see a more diversified ownership structure (La-
Porta et al. 1999).  
 
Specific conditions for the governance cycle in transition economies 
 Returning to the case of transitional economies, we expect that a specific governance cycle 
exists in firms in those countries. The dynamics of enterprise governance and ownership are quite 
distinct in transitional economies because enterprises go through both a transition in ownership 
structure, a transition in relation to the changing institutions in the environment, and a transition of 
the market in relation to prices, costs, and competitive structure with a strong pressure for restruc-
turing of products and production methods. Therefore, most enterprises in transition economies start 
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with rapidly changing the structure of governance combined with a strong pressure for restructuring 
production simply to be able to survive. The specific elements in early transition that influence the 
governance cycle are shown in Table 2. 
To understand the specific governance cycles appearing in transitional economies there are 
three special conditions that must be taken into account. The first of these factors is the privatiza-
tion process. The early years of transition created specific conditions for the initial development of 
private ownership. The different methods favored different types of owners.  For example, in some 
countries employees had a strong political position resulting in a very high frequency of employee 
ownership. Also, often managers had a strong position in relation to the political system. On the 
other hand, voucher privatization could lead to a high degree of domestic external ownership, while 
direct sale without restrictions for foreign capital gave foreign investors the lead in the change to 
concentrated external ownership (Mygind 2001). The privatization process can be seen as a state 
governed process where the specific privatization methods creating a specific ownership structure, 
which would not have developed in a more market based system for ownership adjustments. It can 
be argued that path-dependency may create a learning process and institutional development, which 
may lead to specific paths for subsequent developments in the governance structure. Such path de-
pendencies can to a high degree be used for explaining persistent differences in the governance 
structure in the West.2 On the other hand, it can be expected that there will be post-privatization ad-
justments bringing the ownership structure back to a more “normal” equilibrium. 
 A second condition occurs because, from the start of transition, nearly all state owned enter-
prises are confronted with a strong pressure for restructuring of production, production methods, 
organizational structure and markets. They are in a situation of crisis with an acute need of capital, 
new skills, and new networks. In the developed market economies this would very often lead to a 
change in ownership bringing new investors with the necessary resources for restructuring. In some 
cases, privatization has delivered the best-fitted investor for this restructuring. In other cases post 
privatization dynamics include a takeover to facilitate such restructuring.  
 However, there is a third and most important feature of transitional economies, which delays 
this kind of ownership adjustment. This concerns the process of building up a well-functioning 
market economy and especially developing the necessary institutions that are required to facilitate 
the adjustment of governance structures in enterprises. In the early stage of transition, the lack of 
developed institutions favors special types of ownership arrangements. For example, insiders have 
an advantage in relation to outside owners because the institutions supporting outside ownership 
such as credible auditing procedures and transparent stock markets are not developed (Mygind 
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2001). The delayed development of the institutional framework combined with stabilization and 
more developed markets enables other adjustments of the ownership structure to be made. 
 
Hypotheses about the specific governance cycle in transition economies  
 
Based on these three special conditions some specific hypotheses about the governance cycle in 
transition can be developed. However, since some conditions can give tendencies whose directions 
are ambiguous, the final conclusions must be based on empirical analysis. 
 The first set of hypotheses concerns the scope and resilience of employee ownership. We 
note that the privatization process in many countries, including the Baltic Republics, has led to a 
high degree of broad employee ownership. However, employees’ lack of governance skills, their 
lack of capital and the risk-concentration may lead to a tendency to sell to other investors that is 
quite rapid. This movement away from employee ownership could be delayed by various factors 
including: if learning processes give employees higher governance skills; if there are strong defen-
sive arguments for keeping ownership to protect employment; or if the specific company has a high 
degree of specific human capital, which would be threatened by a sale to another investor.  
 In general, the lack of development of the institutional environment weakens the role of ex-
ternal investors. The lack of transparency and high risk especially in the early stages of transition 
combined with the lack of markets for company shares means that, in general, managers have a 
strong advantage compared to external investors (Kalmi 2002). Therefore, it can be expected that 
managers often take over the shares that the broad group of employee wants to sell. Especially, dur-
ing the early stages of transition there will be a strong tendency for ownership changes from em-
ployees to managers. The exceptions are expected to be relatively small enterprises with high hu-
man capital. 
 Some privatization methods provided for a high degree of public offering of shares to diver-
sified external owners. To some extent this was the situation in Lithuania with voucher privatiza-
tion. Also, in many countries, privatization to former employees in agricultural entities would be 
registered as sales to external owners. These kinds of sales would often mean overly diversified 
ownership in relation to the volatility of the markets, the low quality of information to external 
owners and the lack of development of the institutional framework. At the same time most of these 
initial small external shareholders were under strong wealth constraints. Therefore, during the early 
years these companies will be in a process of concentration of ownership. Because of their strong 
position it is expected that managers will take over companies from diversified external owners. 
Such management takeovers will be accompanied by an increase in ownership concentration. Also 
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concentration in the hands of a smaller group of external investors (including foreign) can be part of 
this process.  
 When the institutional framework becomes more advanced during the process of transition it 
can be expected that external investors will get a stronger position, and we will see shifts from in-
sider to outsider ownership. This tendency will be strengthened if the company, either because of 
high growth or because of pressure for restructuring, has a strong need for extra capital.  
 The stock markets in the transitional countries are quite weak, with few companies listed, 
low capitalization and low turnover  and IPOs are rare (EVCA, 2003). Therefore, it is too early to 
observe the tendency found in the west for more mature firms to diversify ownership to small ex-
ternal investors. Instead we expect a dominating tendency in the direction of higher concentration 
of ownership also when we look at continued external ownership. 
 The specific ownership development for privatized enterprises can be expected to be quite 
different from the dynamics for new start-ups. For new firms we expect developments to follow the 
cycle of Western economies to a much higher degree with manager-owned start-ups subsequently 
being taken over by external domestic owners or, for the most successful cases, by foreign inves-
tors. However, while new start-ups are not influenced by the special transitional privatization-bias, 
they are still subject to gaps in the institutional environment thus pushing them in the direction of 
the specific transition-economy governance cycle. 
 In many cases foreign companies establish their subsidiary companies directly as new 
greenfield entities. In these cases we expect a rather stable ownership structure. Also when foreign 
investors have taken over companies in the privatization process we expect that these enterprises 
have reached their final stage of development in the ownership cycle - we expect no further changes 
of ownership within the relatively short time-horizon of our analysis. However, in cases where the 
foreign subsidiary has been established as a joint-venture in early transition we expect a change to a 
wholly owned subsidiary when the legislation opens up for this possibility. We summarize the ex-
pected governance cycle for a firm in a transition economy in Table 3. 
However, it should be noted that the analysis has emphasized some general tendencies for 
the governance cycle in transitional countries in comparison to Western countries. This leads us to 
expect to find some quite similar tendencies in the three Baltic countries. We also expect that the 
existence of cross national differences, especially concerning institutional differences related to the 
speed and form of transition, may make the starting points and the speed of change between differ-
ent phases of the cycle slightly different across countries. The dominant form of privatization will 
determine to what degree the starting point of the cycle for privatized firms will be employee own-
ership or perhaps foreign ownership (Mygind 2001). In addition to the specific privatization meth-
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ods the advancement of the institutional development and the general economic and political stabil-
ity will determine the level of foreign investment (Bevan et. al. 2004). The speed of change also 
depends on the transition of institutions. The development of the banking sector and the possibility 
of debt financing are especially important. The dynamics also depend on the development of the 
capital-market and the possibility of expanding the equity both for listed companies and for trading 
shares of non-listed companies. In turn this might be expected to produce differences in ownership 
concentration at particular times.  
Hence, in the next section we look more closely at specific developments in the three Baltic 
countries. In turn, we will then develop some hypotheses for how this can be expected to affect the 
character of corporate governance cycles, especially the starting points and speed of ownership 
change in these countries. 
 
III. Privatization and Governance Institutions in the Baltic Countries 
 The results of privatization in the Baltic countries are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. There 
have been important differences in starting conditions and in political development. Therefore, dif-
ferent paths have been chosen for changing the ownership structure from a planned system to a 
market system based on private ownership (for a deeper analysis sees Mygind 1997 and 2000). In 
Estonia the nationalist-oriented policies in relation to the large Russian-speaking minority meant 
that the period supporting broad employee takeovers of enterprises was very short and except for a 
few experiments and some large agricultural enterprises only covered the privatization of small and 
medium sized enterprises. This was also the case in Latvia, but here a large group of small and me-
dium sized enterprises initially leased by their employees were later formally taken over by em-
ployees. Therefore, we also have some privatizations to employees later in the process in Latvia. 
Before independence, employee takeovers implied that control was taken away from central au-
thorities in Moscow to the Baltic Republics. When this goal was accomplished in Estonia and Lat-
via the next goal was both to strengthen the position of the titular population and to find a more ef-
ficient ownership structure.  
 In Lithuania, with a negligible Russian-speaking minority, workers and employees in gen-
eral had a much stronger political role. The early ideas of insider-takeovers were further developed 
in the early years of transition with the implementation of the “Program of Initial Privatization”, 
called LIPSP. At the same time, there was strong resistance against selling out Lithuania to foreign 
investors. Lithuanians feared Russian takeovers. Lithuanian policies for a long period were quite 
restrictive towards FDI. Estonia, on the other hand, implemented very liberal rules for foreign capi-
tal, opening up the economy to the inflow of especially Finnish and Swedish capital. 
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 In the former Soviet Union, the first movements in the direction of private enterprises (in 
the form of new cooperatives, individual firms, leasing and joint ventures) began during the second 
half of the 1980s (Bim, Jones and Weisskopf, 1993). Similar developments took place in what were 
to become the Baltic Republics, especially in Estonia, which functioned as a laboratory for market 
reforms in the USSR. The “small state enterprises” with semi-private spin offs from state owned 
enterprises were part of this development. Also in Latvia, rapid development of new-cooperatives 
made an early start of private entrepreneurship. Most of these firms had a strong element of em-
ployee ownership although often they were dominated by managers. 
 All three countries have had large voucher schemes involving most residents. However, in 
both Estonia and Latvia the bulk of vouchers were related to the privatization of land and housing. 
In Lithuania 65 per cent of the vouchers were used in enterprise privatization in the LIPSP program 
- in Estonia only 28 per cent and in Latvia 42 per cent (Mygind 2000). In Estonia and Latvia most 
of these vouchers went to broad public offerings of minority holdings after the sale of the majority 
to a core investor. A core investor could also finance a big share of the down payment by vouchers 
in the tender privatizations. In Lithuania, vouchers could only be used in the LIPSP-program. Often 
majority share holdings were bought mainly for vouchers. Although the LIPSP privatization re-
sulted in a more diversified ownership structure than the tender privatizations in Estonia and Latvia, 
in most cases a core group of owners, most often insiders, acquired a majority of shares.  
 Because of the limited role of vouchers in enterprise privatization in Estonia and Latvia 
investment funds were not important. However, in Lithuania 300-400 investment funds were started 
in relation to the LIPSP program. While many funds were used as a mechanism enabling a group of 
insiders to take control of their companies, some of them developed into more orthodox investment 
funds representing a high number of investors and with a diversified portfolio in a large number of 
companies. However, there were severe governance problems, giving the shareholders too little in-
fluence on the administrators, resulting in asset stripping of many funds. When the regulation was 
tightened in 1997, most of the investment funds were dissolved.  
 The timing of privatization of small enterprises was quite similar for the three countries. 
The majority of small enterprises were privatized 2-3 years after the start of transition. However, 
for the medium and large enterprises there have been marked differences. With the implementation 
of the LIPSP program, Lithuania was at its peak of privatization in 1993 and larger enterprises were 
privatized by the end of 1994. However, in most companies some shares remained state owned, and 
especially in some very large companies only around 10 per cent of the shares were privatized, so in 
total only around 50 per cent of the capital was privatized in the companies involved. In Estonia 
privatization had its greatest momentum by 1994 and most large enterprises were privatized by the 
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end of 1995. In Latvia privatization gained momentum in 1995-96 to peak in 1997, and large priva-
tization was nearly accomplished by the end of 1998. Looking at the largest enterprises in utilities 
and infrastructure, Estonia was fastest followed by Latvia. While being fastest in the first round, 
Lithuania was slowest in the last round of privatization although it regained momentum in 1998. 
 Foreign investors played only a minor role in the privatization of small enterprises. The 
advantages for insiders crowded out the possibilities for outsiders, especially foreign investors. 
However, after 1992, foreign investors had some possibilities in Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuania 
foreigners had a weak position not only in small privatization, but also in the LIPSP privatization. 
Foreigners, however, soon got opportunities to start up new firms. Again, this happened somewhat 
faster in Estonia than in the other Baltic countries. 
 Estonia was the first country to use privatization to promote foreign investment in relation 
to large privatization. In the tender process, foreign investors had a strong position because of their 
access to capital, management skills, and international business networks. From 1993 foreigners 
took over many of the largest enterprises under privatization. By the end of 1998 foreigners had 
taken over approximately one third of enterprise assets included in large privatization. Latvia 
started the same process in the autumn of 1994 and the foreign share of purchase was 38 per cent 
for the years 1994-1998. In Lithuania the LIPSP privatization gave very little room for foreigners, 
and only 4 enterprises were taken over by foreign investors in “the privatization for hard currency” 
of 46 enterprises in the period up to 1995. After LIPSP the pace of privatization stagnated and not 
until 1998 did foreign capital start to play an important role in privatization in Lithuania.  
 Table 6 gives an overview of developments in the Baltics of the main institutions for the 
functioning and development of the governance structures at the enterprise level. Although the Bal-
tic countries started their transition two years later than the leading countries in Central Europe (Po-
land, Czech Republic and Hungary) they are about to catch up (EBRD 2003). The legislation on 
bankruptcy procedures was developed quite early in Estonia, September 1992. The law was strictly 
enforced so by 1995 more than 1000 bankruptcies had already been implemented. Therefore, take-
overs of liquidated assets can be assumed to have an important role in the ownership dynamics in 
Estonia. In Latvia and Lithuania bankruptcy laws were passed in 1992, but implementation was 
relatively weak. The legislation was strengthened in Latvia in 1996 and in Lithuania in 1997 and 
the implementation has been tightened in the latest years. However, according to an EBRD survey, 
the implementation of laws has been somewhat slower in Latvia and Lithuania than in Estonia. 
 Quite early in the transition process state-owned banks were split into a two-tier system 
with a Central Bank and a number of commercial banks to be privatized later in the process. This 
bank privatization was performed fastest in Estonia peaking in 1995, in Latvia in 1996, and in 
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Lithuania only in 2001. A large number of new private banks were established in the early years of 
transition to service some of the large enterprises. Many of these banks had a weak capital base, but 
the development of the financial sector shows a strong consolidation with a fall in the number of 
banks and a development of banking activities from simple money transfers to deepening the main 
activity of channeling savings from the population to lending to companies. However, this devel-
opment has been quite unstable and most of the countries have been through severe financial crises. 
The financial system developed relatively fast in Estonia. As early as 1992-93 the system was 
strengthened after a major financial crisis. In Latvia there was an even more serious banking crisis 
in 1995 involving the largest commercial bank in Latvia. In Lithuania three of the largest banks 
were in crisis in 1995/96. In all three countries the largest banks are now owned by Scandinavian 
banks and the importance of the banks for supplying capital to enterprises has increased much re-
cently.  
 The Tallinn Stock Exchange opened in May 1996. Before that time some trading of shares 
had taken place in the over-the-counter market. The privatization throughpublic offerings of minor-
ity shares facilitated the development of the exchange, but there has been no strong relation be-
tween the privatization process and the development of the stock exchange. The Tallinn stock ex-
change is characterized by a small number of companies and only a few of them are heavily traded. 
Capitalization and turnover on the Riga Stock Exchange are considerably lower than in Estonia. 
However, following the acceleration of privatization of large companies and the associated public 
offerings of shares, the Latvian stock exchange has developed quite rapidly in recent years. The Na-
tional Stock Exchange of Lithuania was established in September 1993, closely connected to the 
LIPSP privatization process. Although more than 600 enterprises were listed, capitalization in rela-
tion to GDP was not higher in Lithuania than in Estonia and turnover has been low with thin trading 
of most companies. The three Baltic stock exchanges have started a common Baltic list of blue-chip 
stocks. The three exchanges are connected to NOREX, dominated by the stock exchanges in Stock-
holm and Copenhagen. This integration will probably further accelerate the strengthening of regu-
lation and transparency. Importantly, however, for the overwhelming majority of Baltic enterprises, 
including those investigated in this paper, the stock exchanges have no influence on their govern-
ance because they are not listed. 
 The general picture of the transition in the three Baltic countries is that similarities 
dominate. For all three Baltic countries we expect to see a strong representation of insider owner-
ship including employee ownership in the early years of transition. Especially, for Estonia and Lat-
via there is a bias towards employee ownership in relation to small and medium firms, while in 
Lithuania the LIPSP privatization also enables the introduction of employee ownership in quite 
 16
large and capital-intensive enterprises (Mygind 2000). Since privatization to foreigners was allowed 
earlier in Estonia, this would lead us to expect that foreign ownership as a starting point of the gov-
ernance cycle would be more frequent in Estonia than elsewhere. 
Estonia’s faster development of the financial sector, early tough bankruptcy legislation and 
in general the fastest institutional development can be expected to encourage a faster speed of 
change in the ownership cycle than in the other countries. This is both because the optimal owner-
ship structure will converge to the western model at an earlier date and because the institutional de-
velopment means that it will be easier to make the necessary adjustments. For example, managers 
have better access to capital for takeovers from the more developed banking system. A fast reactive 
restructuring means that employment is expected to be cut quite fast in the early stages of transition 
in Estonia. When employee owners leave the company they may keep their shares and for employee 
owned companies this may mean a change in ownership from employees to former employees. Fi-
nally, a fast transition process and development of the institutional system improve the business 
climate and attract foreign investors facilitating a faster change of ownership structures in the direc-
tion of foreign ownership.  
 
IV. Data and empirical analysis 
Much literature has examined ownership structures after privatization in transition econo-
mies with considerable attention paid to investigating the relation between ownership and perform-
ance (e.g. Estrin and Wright 1999; Djankov and Murrell, 2002.) By contrast, in part because of the 
inability to access panel data sets, studies that investigate post-privatization ownership dynamics 
are quite rare and have tended to be concentrated in a few transition countries (e.g. Earle and Estrin 
(1996), Blasi et al (1997), Estrin and Wright (1999) Filatochev et al 1999)3. 
 Another body of work in this area is our own for the Baltic Republics. In our previous work 
(e.g. Jones and Mygind, 1999) we analyze the determinants behind the ownership changes after pri-
vatization by using panel data for Estonia. We find that high capital-intensive companies are more 
likely to be owned by outsiders and that economic performance does not seem to be the key deter-
minant of ownership structure. Outside ownership often develops in stages so that companies with 
minority outside ownership have a high probability of being taken over by outsiders4. 
 In this chapter we build on our earlier work and provide a comparative empirical analysis of 
ownership dynamics in all three Baltic countries. Moreover the analytical focus on the idea of the 
existence of governance cycle dynamics is novel. Thus we wish to see if there is empirical support 
for our notion of the governance life cycle and to see if this is equally apparent in all countries. In 
addition, we progress beyond previous empirical work for the Baltics and include ownership con-
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centration in the analysis. Furthermore, since we have obtained new data for Estonia, our analysis 
covers both the early years of privatization and also companies privatized in the main rounds 
through the Estonian Privatization Agency. Also, whereas previous work typically has investigated 
a single change in ownership, our analysis of governance cycle dynamics examines several steps in 
ownership changes. Ownership groups are determined according to the widely used “dominant 
owners” approach, where the firm is assigned to the ownership group holding more shares than any 
other group5.  
 For each of the three Baltic countries we have collected data through ownership surveys de-
signed by the authors. In this way we assemble ownership for a panel of firms in all three countries. 
However, for reasons including varying opportunities for data collection, the nature of the panel 
data sets data varies from country to country. 
The Estonian panel is derived from a sample of 500 private enterprises in 1995, stratified by 
size and industry. Of the original 500 firms, 409 (82%) cooperated in the initial ownership survey 
undertaken in 1995. Respondents were asked to indicate the number of shares held by different 
groups on January 1st 1995 as well as at the time of privatization. Subsequent ownership surveys 
were administered annually with the last survey in 2002. During this process some firms exited the 
panel because of closure or denial of response6. Other groups were added later to give a broad cov-
erage of later stages of the privatization process7. The total group of companies included in this un-
balanced panel is 800 companies.  
The ownership data for Latvia is based on an ownership survey performed by the Statistical 
Department of Latvia under the authors’ direction. The sample for the analysis was chosen from the 
Statistical Departments financial datasets for Latvian enterprises and was based on the following 
criteria: availability of financial data; employment of at least 20 for at least one year during 1994-
1997; and some overrepresentation of enterprises with more than 100 employees. Based on these 
criteria, the Statistical Department received responses from 1054 enterprises that contained details 
of ownership structures for 1997, 1998 and 1999. For 730 of these enterprises we also have owner-
ship information for 1995 and 1996 from the surveys administered by the statistical departments 
themselves, though without the distinction for insiders between employee and manager ownership.    
 The ownership information for Lithuania is based on a manager-survey performed in the 
spring of 2000. It provides information on ownership at the time of privatization, and for start-up 
firms in 1993, 1996, 1999 and spring 2000 for 405 respondents. The sample is a stratified random 
sample and is derived from a database covering 7546 enterprises that provided financial data for 
1997. In constructing our sample we applied the following criteria: eliminate firms that were fully 
state owned enterprises or were very small (in fact, employed fewer than 20 employees); include all 
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(large) enterprises with more than 100 employees and one third of the smaller firms  (employing 
20-100). Applying these criteria resulted in 1372 enterprises being identified. Attempts were made 
to contact all these enterprises, though many were found to have closed and others refused to re-
spond. The 405 responses make up around 30% of the initial group.  
The first step in our empirical work is to report simple descriptive statistics for initial own-
ership structure. In Table 7 we show the relation between the initial ownership at the time of priva-
tization or start up as a new private firm and the year of privatization/start up. From the description 
of the privatization process it can be expected that employee ownership is most frequent in the early 
stages of transition. In fact the data reveal that this tendency is most pronounced for Estonia and 
that it is also evident for Lithuania. However, this phenomenon is not apparent in Latvia, probably 
because of the high number of leased enterprises, which were not formally taken over by the em-
ployees until later in the privatization process. For Estonia, privatizations to domestic external own-
ers8 increase over the observed period, while privatizations to foreign and managers have no clear 
tendency9.  
Most of the foreign dominated enterprises are new firms; this is especially the case in 
Lithuania. The exception is the Estonian large privatization during 1994-99 when many companies 
were taken over by foreigners. The relatively low total number of privatized foreign enterprises 
makes it difficult to see a clear development over time for privatizations to foreigners. Management 
ownership is dominant for new enterprises, but management has also assumed ownership of a high 
share of privatized enterprises. Domestic and especially employee ownership is more frequent for 
privatization than for new start-ups. However, external domestic start-ups vary from 15% of the to-
tal start-ups in Lithuania to 30% in Estonia. The high frequency may be explained by the entre-
preneur being backed by closely related external investors or by external investors setting up sub-
sidiaries e.g. in trade. The importance of new employee-owned enterprise varies from 7% in 
Lithuania to 12% in Estonia. For the early years this can probably be explained by the emergence of 
new cooperatives and new entities spun off from existing state-owned enterprises10.  
 In the rest of this section we present fresh evidence on ownership dynamics. Before doing 
so, however, some methodological remarks are in order. The datasets we use are as described 
which, for Estonia, spans the time of privatization until 2002, for Latvia from 1995-1999, and for 
Lithuania from 1993-1999. The longer observation period for Estonia mean that the data can be 
used to analyze a sequence of up to four ownership changes, rather than the single switch that is 
customary. To maximize the number of observations we have included companies, which have been 
privatized later in the process, and companies for which we do not have information about the full 
period.11. The changes for Latvia and Lithuania are reported as a two-step process for the first and 
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the last observed ownership types. These processes are shown in a series of ownership transition-
matrices as explained below. 
We should note that not all the changes in the nature of the identity of the dominant owner 
are reported in the tables. If the governance cycle follows a pattern by which dominant ownership 
reverts to an earlier configuration, for example “employee-manager-domestic-manager”, then this is 
considered as a shift from employee to manager ownership. That is, we assume that intermediate 
changes such as manager-domestic-manager are simply temporary adjustments involving relatively 
few shares.  
For all three countries we have information about the concentration of ownership for the 
largest single owner. For the descriptive ownership analysis we have used this to define ownership 
of former employees as diversified domestic ownership with the largest single owner having less 
than 20% of ownership. This definition can be justified because practically no enterprises were pri-
vatized to diversified external owners. It is important to distinguish between the groups of domestic 
external investors and former employees because there are basic differences between the process 
behind the ownership change to external investors and to employee-owners leaving the firm but 
keeping their ownership.  
The transition matrix for Estonia12 (Table 8) shows the change between first ownership type 
after privatization (or when the firm started as a new entity), until the last year for which informa-
tion are available13. The matrix shows that 114 enterprises, which were foreign owned at the start of 
privatization (or when they were set up as new firms), also were foreign owned at the last year of 
record. From the relevant row it can also be seen that 10 changed to domestic dominant ownership 
and 9 to manager ownership while none ended up as employee owned. This means that, as pre-
dicted, foreign owned enterprises have a quite stable ownership structure with a total “ownership-
change” rate of only 14%. Therefore, as expected, foreign ownership can be placed at the last part 
of the governance cycle. Firms that became foreign owned can be seen by examining the first col-
umn. Such firms emerge mainly from domestic externally owned enterprises, but also from man-
agement owned. Only four take the shortcut directly from employee ownership. These results fit 
well with the last stage of the predicted governance cycle: management?external domes-
tic?foreign. 
 Firms with external domestic ownership from the start have a higher rate of “ownership 
change” (26.7%). 19.1% has changed into management ownership. In 5 of the reported cases in Ta-
ble 9 the accompanying change in concentration was constant and in another 5 cases it was increas-
ing, while in 3 cases ownership concentration fell. However, the fall for these three is quite steep so 
that the average development for all 13 enterprises for the period 2000-02 was a fall in concentra-
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tion. This is reported in Table 9, which only covers the later years when we started to collect con-
centration data in Estonia.  
Of firms that were initially management-owned, 23.6%  have changed ownership type and 
most of these have changed to outside ownership (15.7% to domestic and 5.7% to foreign). For the 
later years reported in Table 9 these changes are accompanied by both upward and downward 
changes in concentration leaving the average quite constant. Only 3 (2.1%) have changed into em-
ployee ownership. However, movement away from employee ownership proceeds at a very high 
rate with more than seven in ten cases switching ownership type. In about half of these 71.7% the 
move is to ownership by management. This includes 35.4% of the initial group, compared to 28.3% 
to outside ownership and 8.1% to former employees. The high rate of change of employee owned 
firms confirms the prediction of the high frequency of this specific type of changes in transition 
economies. It is a bit surprising that ownership by former employees is more stable than employee 
ownership. However, the continuation of ownership by employees leaving the firm can be taken as 
an indicator of inertia, which also functions as a barrier for further ownership changes. Employee 
ownership has quite low concentration of ownership on the single largest owner and Table 9 shows 
that the changes away from both employee and former employee ownership is accompanied by 
quite steep increases in concentration. In general the concentration rate is increasing over the period 
and the steepest increases happen in parallel with shifts in ownership. 
 The results on ownership dynamics are robust to shortening the period to 1999 or to includ-
ing only firms with full information for the period 1995-1999. For this restricted group (N=373) the 
rate of change away from foreign ownership is 15%, while the corresponding numbers are 26% 
from domestic ownership, 22% from dominant ownership by managers, 72% from employee owned 
firms and 29% away from firms owned by former employees. These changes are similar to those 
generated by the larger sample except for the category of “former employees” where the rate of 
change is rather lower (by some 8%) compared to figures based on the total sample.14
Surprisingly, the results are also quite robust to dividing the groups into privatized and new 
start-ups. Because of the initial disequilibrium in ownership caused by privatization one might ex-
pect a higher rate of change for privatized companies. However, the initial years of transition are 
very volatile both for privatized and new companies both because of rapidly changing markets and 
institutional environment. In a more stable institutional environment one might expect a higher 
change-rate for new companies compared to more mature companies.  
Table 10 shows findings derived from the analysis when intermediary changes between the 
initial and final ownership configurations that are given in the transition matrix are examined.15 
While dominant ownership changes in 171 cases, in 29 instances we observe a second ownership 
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switch while in 5 cases there is third categorical change.16 The most frequent initial change is from 
employee to managerial ownership change and the most frequent three-step change is, as predicted, 
from employee?manager?outsider (1 to foreign and 5 to domestic). The pattern em-
ployee?external domestic?manager is recorded with 5 cases, but 3 of these have a fourth step with 
the firm ending up as foreign-owned, and therefore they come close to the predicted employee?ma-
nager?outsider. Hence we conclude that this is clearly the most frequent ownership cycle in our 
sample. Our predictions are also supported by the high frequency of initial ownership changes that 
are of the type manager?domestic (representing 73% of the first-changes from manager owner-
ship), as well as the fact that 49% of the changes away from employee ownership are from em-
ployee?manager. The existence of a frequency of domestic?manager movements that is quite high 
might reflect the fact that our cases labeled domestic also may include former employee ownership, 
but with a concentration higher than our limit of 20%. It could also be the case when diversified 
domestic ownership is substituted by more concentrated management ownership, as predicted in the 
theoretical section.  
 For Latvia we report transition matrices both for the period 1995-99, for which we cannot 
distinguish between manager and employee-ownership in 1995, and for 1997-99 where the avail-
able data do enable us to make the distinction (see Tables 11-13). If we do not include the broad 
insider category for the starting point of 1995 we are able to identify ownership cycles  with 3-steps 
for only 4 out of 915 enterprises.17 Therefore, we report ownership dynamics in transition matrices 
with only two points in time. The combination of insider ownership in 1995 and manager owner-
ship in 1997 is counted as manager ownership for both years. Therefore, the switch from employee 
ownership to manager ownership, that is expected to be the most frequent change, is not able to be 
identified during this period. The change in this direction is in the table only for firms with no data 
for the first years18.  
 Table 11 shows some of the same patterns that we saw for Estonia. Insider ownership is by 
far the least stable ownership category. The most frequent change is from insider to former em-
ployee (38 cases). If we include these cases as employee owned from the start, we end up with a 
change away from employee ownership on the same magnitude as in Estonia. Except for the 13 
cases coming from ownership by former employees we see very few cases switching over to em-
ployee ownership. Many enterprises owned by insiders are also seen to be moving to domestic ex-
ternal ownership. 
When we only look at the period 1997-99 (Table 12) managerial ownership is surprisingly 
stable, whereas both ownership by employees and former employee again are changing most com-
monly. As in Estonia, the most frequent changes are from employee to manager ownership and 
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from ownership by former employee to ownership by external domestic owners. Both these changes 
are accompanied with steep increases in concentration among the largest single type of owner (Ta-
ble 13). Switches from domestic to managerial ownership and in the other direction from manager 
to domestic are also quite frequent. In addition, as in Estonia, some changes are accompanied by an 
increase in concentration. However, it is also worth noting that the level of concentration on aver-
age is lower in Latvia than in Estonia. This difference can be only partly explained by the fact that 
the Estonian concentration data are observed three years later. Also, switches to managerial owner-
ship from external domestic ownership probably include cases of takeovers from former employ-
ees.19 Finally, when we split the group into new and privatized enterprises, this does not reveal any 
differences in patterns of ownership dynamics between these two groups. 
 The last Baltic republic for which we are able to furnish new empirical evidence is Lithua-
nia. There we can follow the change during the period from the time of privatization and the years 
when data from ownership surveys were collected, namely for 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2000. From all 
of these cases in only 15 instances was there more than one shift in ownership. Since this group is 
too small to identify specific tendencies, as in Latvia, ownership dynamics are shown in a matrix 
that covers only the first and the last recorded private ownership type. The results show the same 
pattern as we have seen earlier with employee and former employee owned enterprises being the 
least stable. Although the period covered is the same length as in Estonia, the rate of change away 
from employee ownership is somewhat lower than in Estonia. This is probably due to the slower 
development of the surrounding governance institutions in Lithuania. The average concentration 
rate on the largest single owner increases in Lithuania from 41.6% to 47.5% during the period of 
observation. While this is around the same level as in Latvia, it is still far less than the level of more 
than 60% observed in Estonia (compare Table 9 and Table 15). Part of the difference can be ex-
plained by a higher proportion of foreign and domestic external ownership and a lower proportion 
of employee owned enterprises in the Estonian sample. Nevertheless, Estonia has a higher concen-
tration rate separately for each of these ownership categories. These differences can be interpreted 
as another manifestation of the more advanced development of institutions in Estonia having facili-
tated more rapid adjustments of ownership. This adjustment concerns both ownership concentration 
and owners’ identities. At the same time, it is expected that it will take several years before the Bal-
tic countries reach the next stage in the development of institutions favoring small diversified exter-
nal owners in large enterprises. 
The most frequent change in Lithuania is clearly from employee to managerial ownership, 
followed by the change from employee and former employee ownership directly to external domes-
tic ownership. All these changes are accompanied by steep changes in concentration. As in other 
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countries, except for one case, there are no shifts from outside ownership to employee ownership. 
Foreign owned companies again are the most stable form of ownership, although here they are not 
significantly more stable than is domestic outsider ownership. While the number of foreign owned 
enterprises is increasing, it remains quite low. The frequency of 11 former employee owned firms 
going to outside domestic ownership is quite high. In these firms the concentration on the single 
largest outside owner has increased from below 20% to more than 20% or, for the 5 enterprises in-
cluded in Table 15, from 11.4% to 42.9%. Finally, as is the case with the two other Baltic countries, 
there are no significant differences between the dynamics of privatized firms and new firms. Hence, 
all in all, findings based on the Lithuanian data also fits quite well with the proposed transitional 
governance cycle of employee?manager?external domestic?foreign. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 We have investigated changes in governance structures and focused on the identity of own-
ers over the life-cycle of the company. Based on agency, property rights, transaction cost and re-
source dependence theory and related to key stages of the life-cycle of the firm, we can identify a 
typical governance cycle for developed market economies, namely: manager?outside investor par-
ticipation?outside investor takeover. This cycle develops in parallel with a tendency for a change 
from concentrated to more diversified ownership. Specific governance cycles are also determined 
by developments in the country’s institutional and cultural framework and by specific market de-
velopments. 
The transitional economies are undergoing fundamental changes in institutions with emerg-
ing and changing markets creating specific transitional conditions for enterprises and their life-
cycles. Privatization, pressures for restructuring and weak, but developing institutions define the 
conditions for the evolution of ownership structures. Therefore, specific transitional governance 
cycles can be predicted. Most medium and large enterprises have gone through a process of privati-
zation. The specific method used for the change from state to private ownership determines the ini-
tial ownership structure of the privatized enterprises. In many countries employees were favored in 
the privatization process. This was the case for the privatization of small and medium sized enter-
prises in Estonia and Latvia and for the privatization of medium and large enterprises in the first 
half of the 1990s in Lithuania. For these enterprises we predict an ownership cycle of em-
ployee?manager?outsider (domestic or foreign). This process is expected to take place in parallel 
with increasing concentration of ownership. Since the institutional framework (and especially stock 
markets) are not so developed in transition economies, we do not expect to observe the tendency 
towards diversification that is observed in developed economies. In some cases diversified outside 
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domestic ownership has been the result of privatization. In such cases we expect to witness a cycle: 
diversified domestic?manager?outside concentrated ownership. The shifts in owner-type are ex-
pected to be accompanied by an increase in concentration. In the large privatization in Estonia and 
later in Latvia and even later in Lithuania, enterprises were sold to a core investor, often a foreign 
owner. This ownership structure is predicted to be the last stage in transitional economies and we 
therefore expect that this type will be relatively stable. This does not exclude the possibility for 
changes in the long run to other foreign investors or to new strong domestic investors. The speed of 
the adjustment process for ownership-types and the accompanying concentration processes are ex-
pected to be closely connected to the development of the surrounding governance institutions. 
Change will be slow when, for example, property rights are uncertain, bankruptcy legislation is 
weakly enforced, and the financial system is too weak to play an important role in the financing of 
investments for enterprise restructuring. When institutional reform is successfully implemented the 
development over the governance cycles will speed up, and countries with the fastest transition are 
expected to have most companies reaching the final stages of the specific transitional cycle.  
Our empirical work is based on data generated from new and ownership surveys designed 
by the authors and administered in all three countries. We undertake two kinds of analyses. The first 
and more static analyses involve investigating ownership structures at the time of privatization. In 
these exercises we divide firms into privatized and new enterprises and examine the relation be-
tween time of privatization (time of start-up) and the initial ownership structure. The other analyses 
are more dynamic. Transition matrices that combine information on initial ownership type with 
ownership at a later stage are used to investigate ownership dynamics. This work is supplemented 
by a direct analysis of the frequencies of different cycles of ownership changes for the long panel of 
Estonian enterprises. The change in concentration on the largest owner is directly connected to the 
analysis of change in ownership-identity. While the ownership data goes back to the mid 1990s the 
concentration data, however, only covers the period from 1997 in Latvia and from 2000 in Estonia. 
The static analysis of the initial ownership structure provides support for the predictions de-
rived from our theory of the corporate governance life-cycle.  Privatization and the specific condi-
tions during early transition lead to a specific private ownership structure. Employee owned enter-
prises are found to make up a large share of privatized enterprises in all three countries and they are 
especially related to early privatizations in both Estonia and Lithuania. For Latvia employee owned 
firms are also frequent during later privatization when many companies that were initially leased by 
employees were fully privatized. As predicted employee ownership is rare among new start ups – 
the exception being the new cooperatives started up in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Ownership 
concentration is lowest in employee owned enterprises, higher in firms owned by domestic external 
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owners or managers, and highest in firms that are foreign owned.  Initial management ownership is 
both frequent among privatized and new start ups in all three countries.  
The dynamic analysis of ownership changes for each country strongly supports the proposi-
tion that employee ownership is expected to be the least stable type of ownership and that the most 
frequent takeovers will be undertaken by managers. The analysis also supports the next step in the 
predicted governance cycle for transition economies since managerial ownership mainly changes to 
outside ownership. Most often this involves a shift to external domestic ownership, but there are 
also cases of direct shifts to foreign ownership. Changes back to employee-dominated ownership 
are extraordinary.  External domestic ownership shifts quite frequently to foreign ownership. In this 
way the analysis strongly supports the predicted transitional governance cycle of em-
ployee?manager?external domestic?foreign. The detailed analysis based on the long time-span 
information from Estonia covering 1993-2002 also supports this specific governance cycle. The 
most frequently observed cycle is in fact the predicted: employee?manager?outsider.  
In addition some of our findings were not completely anticipated by our theoretical model of 
the corporate governance cycle. Quite frequently we observe shifts from external domestic to man-
ager ownership. Especially in Latvia and Lithuania this change is accompanied by an increase in 
concentration. Thus, many of the changes are connected to the predicted concentration process, a 
move from relatively diversified domestic ownership to more concentrated management ownership. 
Over time there is a general tendency toward higher concentration. This tendency also applies to 
enterprises with stable ownership, but it is especially strong for enterprises that change their domi-
nant ownership group. This is particularly the case for shifts away from employee ownership, but it 
is also quite strong for movements from domestic outsider to foreign ownership and also for shifts 
from foreign to domestic outsider ownership. The reason behind this strong tendency towards 
higher concentration is that, initially, privatization together with slow development of the institu-
tional framework, resulted in an ownership structure that was too diversified. The limited develop-
ment of the banking sector during early transition meant that reinvestment of profits and extra eq-
uity capital from existing or new core owners was the main source for investment for the necessary 
restructuring. Small diversified shareholders and institutional portfolio investors were rare and they 
were involved in only a handful of listed companies. 
In the analysis of ownership dynamics we separate ownership by former employee from the 
group of domestic outsider dominated enterprises. We assume that low concentration or high diver-
sification of external domestic owners can be understood as a situation where employee owners 
have left the company, but have kept their shares. A substantial part of the changes away from em-
ployee ownership can be explained by this process20.  
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Although there have been quite important differences between the three Baltic countries in 
the privatization processes and the development of different governance institutions, our findings 
indicate that the similarities are more important. In all three countries the corporate governance cy-
cles follow the expected patterns and are accompanied by a strong tendency for higher concentra-
tion. The main differences occur in the speed of the adjustments. The change away from employee 
ownership was fastest in Estonia, and here also the level of concentration is significantly higher 
than for Latvia and Lithuania. In general, Estonia had the fastest transition process. The faster de-
velopment in corporate governance institutions such as the banking system and the implementation 
of strict bankruptcy procedures are probably important factors explaining the faster development 
over the governance cycle of Estonian enterprises compared to firms in Latvia and Lithuania. How-
ever, further research on transition countries with more differences in relation to the institutional 
development can dig deeper into these relations.  
In the literature privatization methods that favor insiders and especially those favoring em-
ployee ownership have often been criticized for delaying restructuring of the economy21.  However, 
performance studies are quite ambiguous on this point22. In any event, this study shows that devel-
opments away from employee ownership are quite fast and follow certain patterns with managerial 
ownership playing a key role. To a large degree the speed of change depends on the development of 
the institutions for corporate governance including the development of the financial sector. In other 
words, there is no reason to worry about unwanted effects of employee privatizations, so long as 
institutional developments are fast. This was the case in Estonia (and in later years in Latvia and 
Lithuania) and, under these circumstances, ownership adjusts and runs through the governance cy-
cle. The developments over the transition-specific governance cycle that are documented in this 
chapter mean that many companies have taken important steps in their restructuring process and 
also transformed the Baltic economies into more advanced market economies. With further institu-
tional developments, including in banking and capital-markets, we would expect the governance 
cycle in the future to be much more similar to what is observed in “old” developed market econo-
mies23. 
 27
 Table 1.  Governance cycles in developed market economies 
Core stages of change in governance/ownership – classical cycle 
start up stage    
entrepreneur-ownership (management, family ownership)   
 
early growth stage  
change in ownership/governance because of need of supply of  
external capital, management skills and networks by: 
- bank (often rather passive role in relation to management) 
- closely related investors, take active part in management 
- venture capital, take active part in management 
 
later growth stage 
change in ownership/governance because of need of supply of  
external capital, management skills and networks by: 
- strategic investor, take full control with the company 
- public investors, often diversified ownership 
 
crisis/restructuring stage   
change in ownership/governance because of takeover by 
- bank (bad loans de facto transferred to ownership capital) 
- venture capital (often specialized in takeovers (often unfriendly)) 
- strategic investor (use opportunity to take over cheap assets) 
- defensive takeover by insiders (to avoid close down and unemployment) 
- close down (assets transferred to other use) 
 
 
Table 2.  Specific elements in early transition influencing the governance cycle 
Starting stage determined by privatization method, which may favor managers,  
other employees, concentrated foreign investors or diversified external ownership.   
 
Most enterprises have a strong need of restructuring 
(inputs, production methods, outputs not adjusted to new market conditions,  
 with a new set of prices and incentives.) 
 
The financial system not developed,  
- external finance from banks limited 
- the stock exchange not functioning 
- venture capital firms not existing 
 
The governance institutions for securing property rights  
(especially shareholder rights) not fully developed 
=>   
widespread insider ownership 
enterprises have to rely on internal finance 
slow strategic restructuring 
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Table 3.  Expected governance cycles in countries in transition 
Privatized (starting point depends on privatization method) 
    employee ? manager ? outside concentrated (domestic ? foreign) 
    diversified domestic ? manager ? outside concentrated (domestic ? foreign) 
    outside concentrated, foreign stable (very long run more diversified for large listed companies) 
New 
     manager ? outside concentrated (domestic ?foreign) 
     foreign  concentrated (stable) 
 
Table 4. Overview over privatization 
 Private 
% GDP 
Large 
priv. 
Small 
priv. 
Main 
method 
Secondary 
method 
Peak 
years 
Estonia 75 4 . 4+ direct sale voucher 1994-95 
Latvia 70 3 . 4+ direct sale voucher 1996-97 
Lithuania 75 4 - 4+ in-
sider/voucher 
direct sale 1992-94 
The Table is based on Mygind 2000, and EBRD 2003, where scores for privatization and govern-
ance range from 1 = none to  4+ = full. 
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Table 5. Overview over privatization of enterprises 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
    
    
    
Early In all three baltic countries end 1980’es: new cooperatives and leasing by worker collective 
according to Soviet legislation, formally worker owned, but management dominated 
From 1991 Estonian leasing                                                      1990-91 employee got shares
200 firms mostly to managers                                                    for around 3% of the assets 
Small first law 1990 gave insiders 
advantages, but these were 
canceled in 1992-93 
first law 1991 gave insiders 
advantages, but these were 
canceled by 1993 
no formal advantages to in-
siders,  
Large few experiments 1989-91 
mostly to employees 
 
From 1992 direct tender sale 
(=German Treuhandanstalt)  
Tenders based on price, in-
vestment- and job-guarantees 
combined with few public 
offerings for vouchers 
1991 experiments to insiders 
1992-94 decentral process, 
234 firms leased to insiders 
 
From 1994 direct tender sale 
through Privatization Agency
combined with some public 
offerings for vouchers 
1991-95 LIPSP privatization 
most shares sold for vouchers
employees could buy 50% of 
shares for quite low price 
 
From 1996 direct tender sale 
through Privatization Agency
1998 State Property Fund 
speeds up tender process  
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Table 6   Overview of corporate governance institutions 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Bankruptcy system Strict legislation 92, 
tough enforcement 
Strict legislation 96, 
tighter enforcement  
Strict legislation 97, 
tighter enforcement 
Governance 
EBRD governance-score   
   competition-regulation 
1995                2002 
    3                      3+ 
    2                      3- 
1995                2002 
    2                      3- 
    2                      2+ 
1995                2002 
    2                       3 
    2                       3 
Bank market 
number of banks (foreign) 
loans to private  % of GDP 
bad loans % of total loans 
bank regulation   
EBRD-score  
1995                2002 
19 (5)               7 (4) 
14.0%            29.8% 
  2.4%              0.8% 
strict already 1992 
    3                      4 
1995                2002 
42 (11)         19 (12) 
  7.5%            33.4% 
19.0%              2.1% 
strict  from 1994 
    3                      4- 
1995                2002 
15 (0)              14 (4) 
12.3%            14.2% 
17.3%              5.8% 
strict  from 1995 
    3                       3 
Stock market           Start 
 
May 1996 
1996                2002 
July 1995 
1996                2002  
September 1993 
1996                2002 
Listed firms 
capitalization % of GDP 
Turnover/capitalization 
EBRD-score  
16                        34 
21%              33.6% 
0.13                  0.54 
   2                      3+ 
    34                    69 
 3.0%               8.0%   
 0.08                 0.17 
    2                       3 
ca. 600                46 
11.4%             9.5%    
  0.04                0.07 
   2                        3 
EBRD Transition Report 2003. Capital market data from central banks and stock exchanges. 
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Table 7 The relation between time of privatization/start and initial ownership 
   Foreign domestic manager employee Total 
Estonia               
privatized to 1992 9 19% 10 21% 10 21% 18 38% 47 100%
  1992 - 1993 9 25% 7 19% 13 36% 7 19% 36 100%
  1994 - 1999 33 13% 144 56% 66 25% 16  6% 259 100%
  total 51 15% 161 47% 89 26% 41 12% 342 100%
new firms to 1992 8* 20% 13 32% 17 42% 3  7% 41 100%
  1992 - 1993 9 12% 27 35% 29 38% 12 16% 77 100%
  1994 - 1999 5 11% 17 39% 17 39% 5 11% 44 100%
  total 22* 15% 57 35% 63 38% 20 13% 162 100%
total   73 15% 218 43% 152 30% 61 12% 504 100%
Latvia              
privatized 1991 1 9% 4 36% 3 27% 3 27% 11 100%
  1992 - 1993 9 4% 109 46% 40 17% 79 33% 237 100%
  1994 - 1997 14 8% 54 32% 57 34% 43 26% 168 100%
  total 24 6% 167 40% 100 24% 125 30% 416 100%
new firms 1991 10 8% 19 16% 76 62% 17 14% 122 100%
  1992 -1993 37 18% 45 22% 101 50% 18 9% 201 100%
  1994 - 1997 43 28% 33 21% 66 42% 13 8% 156 100%
  total 90 19% 97 20% 243 51% 48 10% 479 100%
total   114 13% 264 29% 343 38% 173 19% 895 100%
Lithuania          
privatized 1991 - 1992 3 4% 30 38% 13 16% 33 42% 79 100%
  1993 - 1994 3 3% 38 41% 18 20% 33 36% 92 100%
  1995 - 1998 1 3% 19 51% 9 24% 8 22% 37 100%
  total 7 3% 87 42% 40 19% 74 36% 208 100%
new firms to 1992 5 19% 1 4% 17 65% 3 12% 26 100%
  1993 - 1994 16 44% 6 17% 12 33% 2 6% 36 100%
  1995 - 1996 8 32% 6 24% 10 40% 1 4% 25 100%
  total 29 33% 13 15% 39 45% 6 7% 87 100%
total   36 12% 100 34% 79 27% 80 27% 295 100%
Only private companies included. We do not have the timing-information for all companies. There-
fore, the number of enterprises is lower than in the total datasets.  
*25 foreign new enterprises established before 1992 are not included in table because they were 
later added to the initial random sample. 
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Table 8  Estonia privatization/start -2002 ownership transition matrix: 
               first year as private by last year recorded 
        \last year 
first year  
foreign Domestic manager employee former 
employee 
total Change 
foreign 114 10 9 0 0 133 14,3%
domestic 11 132 37 0 0 180 26,7%
manager 8 22 107 3 0 140 23,6%
employee 6 22 35 28 8 99 71,7%
former emp. 0 4 3 2 15 24 37,5%
total 139 190 191 33 23 576 
       privatized 
        \last year 
first year  
foreign Domestic manager employee former 
employee 
total Change 
foreign 45 4 1 0 0 50 10,0%
domestic 8 106 15 0 0 129 17,8%
manager 2 11 56 2 0 71 21,1%
employee 1 12 15 11 3 42 73,8%
former emp. 0 4 2 2 12 20 40,0%
total 56 137 89 15 15 312 
      new 
        \last year 
first year  
foreign Domestic manager employee former 
employee 
total Change 
foreign 69 6 8 0 0 83 16,9%
domestic 3 26 22 0 0 51 49,0%
manager 6 11 51 1 0 69 26,1%
employee 5 10 20 17 5 57 70,2%
former emp. 0 0 1 0 3 4 25,0%
total 83 53 102 18 8 264 
1. Former employee ownership defined as domestic dominant with concentration < 20% 1999.  
2.Only those firms with domestic dominant ownership and with information on concentration in 
1999 are included; their number fell from 649 to 568. Also including some companies, for which 
we have data only for some years e.g. 1997-2000. 
 
Table 9  Estonia – Transition Matrix and Ownership Concentration  2000 / 2002      
           \2002 
2000 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee  
Total 
foreign 83 
77.5 / 81.1 
6 
61.1 / 74.0 
2 
88.0 / 75.5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
91 
76.7 / 80.5 
domestic 6 
63.5 / 76.6 
122 
78.1 / 79.7 
13 
52.1 / 47.4 
1 
14.0 / 18.0 
- 
- 
142 
74.5 / 76.1 
manager - 
- 
9 
59.5 / 59.1 
107 
61.3 / 61.7 
1 
23.0 / 27.0 
- 
- 
117 
60.8 / 61.1 
employee - 
- 
3 
27.6 / 60.7 
5 
24.8 / 63.4 
18 
19.6 / 20.3 
2 
5.0 / 6.5 
28 
20.3 / 31.3 
former empl - 
- 
5 
14.6 / 28.8 
2 
11.0 / 45.0 
- 
- 
15 
8.5 / 9.5 
22 
10.1 / 17.5 
total 89 
76.6 / 80.8 
145 
73.1 / 75.9 
129 
58.6 / 60.1 
20 
19.5 / 20.5 
17 
8.1 / 9.1 
400 
63.8 / 66.4 
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Table 10  Overview over governance cycle ownership changes (N=576) 
Estonia   
initial dominant owner after 
privatization or start as new  
1st ownership change  to: 2nd ownership change 
 
foreign  
114 (86%) stable 
  19 (14%) change 
133 (100%) total 
  8 (42%) to domestic 
10 (53%) to management 
  1 (  6%) to employees 
19 (100%)  change 
0 
2 to domestic 
1 to manager 
3 
domestic  
132 (73%) stable 
  48 (27%) change 
180 (100%) total 
11 (23%) to foreign 
36 (75%) to management 
  1 (  2%) to employees 
48 (100%)  change 
0 
0 
1 to manager 
1 
manager 
107 (76%) stable 
  33 (24%) change 
140 (100%) total 
  5 (15%) to foreign 
24 (73%) to domestic 
  4 (12%) to employee 
33 (100%) change 
0 
1 to foreign, 2 to employees* 
1 to domestic 
4 
employee 
  28 (28%) stable 
  71 (72%) change 
  99 (100%) total 
  1 (  1%) to foreign 
23 (32%) to domestic 
35 (49%) to manager 
12 (17%) to former empl. 
71 (100%) change 
1 to domestic 
3 to foreign, 5 to manager** 
1 to foreign***, 5 to domestic 
4 to manager 
19 
former employees 
  15 (63%) stable 
    9 (37%) change 
  24 (100%) 
  4 (44%) to domestic 
  1 (11%) to manager 
  4 (44%) to employees 
  9 (100%) 
0 
0 
2 to manager 
2 
total 397 stable 171 first changes 29 second changes 
The Principles for defining ownership change are as follows: Change between to equal values 
deleted. The ownership-sequence employee-employee-manager-domestic-manager-manager is re-
corded as manager-employee. There are observed 5 third changes: * 1 with 3rd change to foreign, ** 
3 with 3rd change to foreign, *** 1 with 3rd change to domestic 
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Table 11  Latvia 1995-1999  Ownership transition matrix private firms  all 
      \ last year 
first year 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee
total Change 
foreign 105 7 6 0 0 118 11,0%
domestic 11 139 20 4 1 175 20,6%
manager 1 9 308 2 1 321 4,0%
employee 1 4 13 118 6 142 16,9%
former emp 0 10 1 13 39 63 38,1%
insider 6 32 12 8 38 96 79,2%
 124 201 360 145 85 915 
             privatized 
      \ last year 
first year 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee
total Change 
foreign 24 2 1 0 0 24 11,1%
domestic 4 79 9 2 1 95 16,8%
manager 0 1 89 0 1 91 2,2%
employee 1 2 9 83 5 100 17,0%
former emp 0 8 0 13 34 55 38,2%
insider 5 16 6 7 32 66 80,3%
 34 108 114 105 73 434 
new 
      \ last year 
first year 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee
total Change 
foreign 81 5 5 0 0 91 11,0%
domestic 7 60 11 2 0 80 25,0%
manager 1 8 219 2 0 230 4,8%
employee 0 2 4 35 1 42 16,7%
former emp 0 2 1 0 5 8 37,5%
insider 1 16 6 1 6 30 76,7%
 90 93 246 40 12 481
Inside ownership 1995 followed by manager (employee) ownership in 1997 is recorded as manager 
(employee) ownership for both 1995 and 1997. Firms going from insider to manager in the table 
had another owner type in between. Former employee ownership is domestic ownership with con-
centration < 20%. 
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Table 12  Latvia 1997-1999  Ownership transition matrix private firms                  all 
           \1999 
1997 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee  
total Change 
foreign 110 8 5 0 0 123 10,6%
domestic 8 161 13 4 2 188 14,4%
manager 2 12 326 2 0 342 4,7%
employee 2 6 15 135 9 167 19,2%
former empl 0 16 0 6 73 95 23,2%
 122 203 359 147 84 915
      privatized 
           \1999 
1997 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee  
total Change 
foreign 26 2 1 0 0 29 10,3%
domestic 5 89 8 3 2 107 16,8%
manager 0 3 95 0 0 98 3,1%
employee 1 2 9 98 9 119 17,6%
former empl 0 13 0 6 62 81 23,5%
 32 109 113 107 73 434 
      new 
           \1999 
1997 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee  
total Change 
foreign 84 6 4 0 0 94 10,6%
domestic 3 72 5 1 0 81 11,1%
manager 2 9 231 2 0 244 5,3%
employee 1 4 6 37 0 48 22,9%
former empl 0 3 0 0 11 14 21,4%
 90 94 246 40 11 481 
 
 
Table 13 Latvia – Transition Matrix and Ownership Concentration  1997 / 1999 
           \1999 
1997 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee  
Total 
foreign 105 
72.1 / 74.7 
8 
53.9 / 64.5 
5 
89.5 / 52.9 
- 
- 
- 
- 
118 
71.6 / 73.1 
domestic 8 
49.5 / 56.3 
152 
59.3 / 59.4 
13 
45.7 / 50.1 
4 
47.2 / 33.5 
2 
49.7 / 11.3 
179 
57.5 / 57.4 
manager 2 
100 / 100 
12 
48.6 / 47.7 
323 
55.8 / 58.4 
2 
33.9 / 58.5 
- 
- 
339 
55.6 / 58.3 
employee 2 
26.7 / 38.8 
6 
33.1 / 32.5 
15 
35.9 / 59.8 
135 
19.1 / 20.2 
9 
6.7 / 10.3 
167 
20.5 / 23.9 
former empl - 
- 
16 
9.05 / 34.9 
- 
- 
6 
6.5 / 21.2 
72 
5.2 / 6.1 
94 
5.9 / 11.8 
total 117 
70.2 / 73.2 
194 
53.4 / 56.1 
356 
55.1 / 58.1 
147 
19.6 / 21.2 
83 
 6.4 / 6.72 
897 
46.4 / 48.8 
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Table 14 Lithuania ownership transition matrix:  privatization/start to 2000          all 
          \2000 
priv/start 
foreign Domestic manager employee former  
employee 
total Change 
foreign 31 3 2 0 0 36 13.9%
domestic 2 70 6 1 3 82 14.6%
manager 3 5 69 6 0 83 16.9%
employee 6 10 33 41 3 93 55.9%
former emp 1 11 4 2 18 36 50.0%
total 43 99 114 50 24 330 
      privatized 
          \2000 
priv/start 
foreign Domestic manager employee former  
employee 
total Change 
foreign 5 2 0 0 0 7 28.6%
domestic 2 60 5 1 3 71 15.5%
manager 2 3 37 2 0 44 15.9%
employee 5 10 30 39 3 87 55.2%
former emp 1 11 3 2 17 34 50.0%
total 15 86 75 44 23 243 
     new 
          \2000 
priv/start 
foreign Domestic manager employee former  
employee 
total Change 
foreign 26 1 2 0 0 29 10,3%
domestic 0 10 1 0 0 11 9,1%
manager 1 2 32 4 0 39 17,9%
employee 1 0 3 2 0 6 66,7%
former emp 0 0 1 0 1 2 50,0%
total 28 13 39 6 1 87 
 
 
Table 15  Lithuania   Transition Matrix and Concentration  privatization/start  /  2000 
          \2000 
priv/start 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee  
Total 
foreign 28 
68.2 / 74.3 
3 
62.7 / 69.4 
2 
55.0 / 62.5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
33 
66.9 / 73.2 
domestic 1 
67.0 / 77.3 
54 
53.1 / 52.2 
5 
27.4 / 42.5 
1 
47.0 / 76.0 
2 
45,7 / 17,1 
63 
51.0 / 51.1 
manager 1 
100 / 50.0 
4 
43.1 / 54.4 
56 
55.8 / 59.8 
5 
77.5 / 44.3 
- 
- 
66 
57.3 / 58.1 
employee 5 
24.8 / 69.5 
9 
32.1 / 36.7 
27 
19.5 / 37.6 
30 
17.1 / 20.5 
2 
16.2 / 16.3 
73 
20.3 / 32.1 
former empl 1 
1.0 / 21.1 
5 
11.4 / 42,9 
4 
11.5 / 49.1 
2 
12.9 / 37.2 
16 
8.9 / 12.1 
28 
  9.8 / 25.0 
total 36 
61.2 / 71.6 
75 
47.6 / 50.5 
94 
41.9 / 52.1 
38 
25.5 / 26.0 
20 
13,3 / 13,0 
263 
41.6 / 47.5 
N is smaller compared with table 14 because we do not have concentration data for all enterprises 
all years. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Country differences in relation to macroeconomic development, institutional framework and 
culture influence the development in the governance structure, and therefore, the governance cycle 
in transitional countries have some specific elements related to the transitional process. We shall  
examine these aspects at a later point in ther paper. 
 
2 For example, compare German and Anglo-American systems. See Roe, 1990. 
 
3 Most of these studies look at Russia and document the strong position of insiders in the Russian 
privatization and the tendency for management takeovers of employee owned enterprises. 
 
4 In a more recent paper Jones et al (2003) build on that work, again using data for Estonia, 
documenting the strong tendency away from employee ownership most often to manager owners. 
Gradual increase in outside ownership is often a process where former employees get majority 
(Kalmi 2002).  
 
5 It turns out that there are no essential differences from the results based on majority owner (for 
Estonia: see Jones and Mygind 1999). But by using the dominant rather the majority ownership 
approach we are able to include firms in our analysis which would otherwise be dropped (the “no 
overall majority” group) and thus we avoid issues of censorship and selectivity. 
 
6The data on the reason for exit does not have enough reliability to be included in the analysis.   
 
7 The panel was supplemented with 25 fully foreign owned enterprises and 232 state-owned 
enterprises. Some prevailed state-owned and have been used as comparisons in the statistical 
analyses, other were closed. Some were later privatized and included in the yearly surveys. In 1999 
134 enterprises privatized through Estonian Privatization Agency was added to the survey.  
 
8 Kalmi (2002) makes for Estonia a deeper analysis of the initial ownership in relation to the origin 
of the company. He finds that firms emerging from the consumer cooperative sector or construction 
association were mostly owned by external domestic investors (members of cooperatives or central 
cooperatives) and successor firms of collective and state farms were taken over by their employees. 
 
9 In Estonia and Lithuania there was a bias in the construction of data so that privatized enterprises 
were over-represented compared to new ones. Therefore, the high proportion of new companies in 
the Latvian sample cannot be taken as indicator of higher entrepreneurship. 
 
10 For spin-offs it is difficult for respondents to choose between the categories new and privatized. 
 
11 We do not have reliable information about whether the reason for exit is in fact close down or 
denial of answering. However, there are no significant differences between the ownership dynamics 
of the group with information for the full period and those that have exited the observation. 
 
12From the 803 Estonian companies in the database we have excluded 154 state-owned for all 
recorded years and 73 domestic externally owned for which we have no concentration data to 
distinguish firms with ownership by former employees. This leaves 576 forms for the analysis. 
Normally we have ownership data for privatized firms from the time of privatization and, for new 
firms, from the date of start-up until 2002. However, in some cases the data series is abbreviated 
when companies stopped participating in later waves of data collection. 
 
13 The results follow the same pattern as the not reported matrix without estimates of former 
employee ownership. 
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14 The total sample covers a longer period, which should give a higher rate of change, but this group 
also includes drop-outs and this draws in the opposite direction. 
 
15 In fact, some intermediary changes are excluded, because they are probably only caused by 
marginal variations. 
 
16 Reported in the notes to the table. 
 
17 Again excluding reversals. 
 
18 The presented results from insider to manager are in fact three-step observations with 
intermediate outsider ownership. 
 
19 Such cases can initially have been recorded as outside domestic ownership because the concen-
tration has been larger than 20. In fact the 13 cases from domestic to management would fall to only 
8 if the definition of former employee ownership were increased to less than 30% concentration. 
Half of the cases of former employees going to domestic would fall away if the borderline changed 
to 30%.  
 
20 This is supported by Kalmi 2002 and by case evidence from Estonia (Kalmi and Mygind 2003).   
 
21 See e.g. Djankov and Murrell 2002. 
 
22 For an analysis of Estonia see Jones and Mygind 2002, and for the Baltics see Jones and Mygind 
2000. 
 
23 In this mainly descriptive paper we have identified the main tendencies among different possible 
sequences for the governance cycle as well as accompanying concentration tendencies. Deeper 
analysis of the specific conditions in the life-cycle of the company, including investigations of the 
different directions for ownership changes and ownership-concentration will require multivariate 
analysis. This will enable diverse issues to be addressed including: What characterizes the em-
ployee owned enterprises that are taken over by the managers? Which enterprises are most likely to 
take further steps in the transitional governance cycle? The corporate governance cycle theory has a 
specter of predictions and in future work we plan to use our panel data to test key hypotheses.  
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